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Abstract
We revisit the issue of multiplicity of equilibria when monetary policy
is conducted with either the interest rate or the money supply as the sole
instrument of policy. We show that in standard monetary models there are
interest rate feedback rules, and also money supply rules, that implement
a unique global equilibrium. This is a contribution to a literature that
either concentrates on conditions for local determinacy, or criticizes that
approach showing that local determinacy might be associated with global
indeterminacy. The interest rate rules we propose are price targeting rules
that respond to the forecasts of future economic activity and the future
price level.
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In this paper we revisit the issue of multiplicity of equilibria when monetary policy
is conducted with either the interest rate or the money supply as the instrument of
policy. There has been an extensive literature on this topic starting with Sargent
and Wallace (1975), including a recent literature on local and global determinacy
in models with nominal rigidities. Most of this literature ￿nds conditions on
policy under which there is a single equilibrium locally, in the neighborhood of
a steady state. Some of this literature points out that the conditions for local
uniqueness are not robust to changes in the environment. Another branch of this
literature criticizes the local approach by pointing out that in general there are
other equilibria, and arguing that the analysis should be global.
Our analysis is global. We show that it is possible to implement a unique
equilibrium globally with an appropriately chosen interest rate feedback rule, and
similarly with a money supply feedback rule of the same type.
The interest rate feedback rules that implement unique equilibria are price
targeting rules where the nominal interest rate is a function of expectations of the
future level of economic activity and the future price level. To the extent that the
interest rate reacts to the forecast of an economic aggregate it resembles the rules
that central banks appear to follow. In the response to the price level it is in the
class of price level targeting rules, that are further apart from the policy debate.
We show the results in the simplest possible model, a cash-in-advance economy
with ￿ exible prices. The results are robust to alternative assumptions on the use
of money and, as we show in the paper, to the consideration of nominal rigidities.
An important assumption, and one that is also standard in this literature, is
that ￿scal policy is endogenous, meaning that taxes can be adjusted residually to
satisfy the budget constraint of the government.
The assumption of an in￿nite horizon is crucial. In ￿nite horizon economies,
the equilibrium is described by a ￿nite dimensional system of equations where
the unknowns are the quantities, prices and policy variables. The number of
degrees of freedom in conducting policy can be counted exactly. It is easy to
see that single instrument policies are not su¢ cient restrictions on policy. They
always generate multiple equilibria. This multiplicity does not depend on the way
policy is conducted, whether interest rates are set as sequences of numbers, or as
backward, current or forward functions of endogenous variables. This is no longer
the case in the in￿nite horizon economy, as we show in this paper.
As is standard in the literature we do not impose the zero bound on the nominal
2interest rate as a restriction on the actions of the government. The interest rate
must be nonnegative in equilibrium but is unrestricted out of equilibrium, as in,
for example, Bassetto (2004) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001. Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001b) assume that the zero bound restriction applies
not only in equilibrium but also to the government actions out of equilibrium.
Under this alternative approach there would also be multiple equilibria in our set
up. It is not clear in the context of these simple models which assumption is more
reasonable, whether the zero bound restriction holds in equilibrium or also out
of equilibrium. The alternative assumptions cannot be assessed empirically. In a
more deeply founded model, Bassetto (2004) shows that the zero bound restriction
should only be satis￿ed in equilibrium. There is a resemblance between this issue
and the heated controversy on Ricardian versus non-Ricardian policies in the ￿scal
theory of the price level1.
As mentioned above, after Sargent and Wallace (1975), and McCallum (1981),
there has been an extensive literature on multiplicity of equilibria when the gov-
ernment follows either an interest rate rule or a money supply rule. This includes
the literature on local determinacy. Contributors to this literature are Woodford
(1994, 2003), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, 2000), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001,
2002), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001a), Dupor (2001), among many
others. In this literature the analysis uses linear approximations of the models, in
the neighborhood of a steady state, and identi￿es the conditions on preferences,
technology, timing of markets, and policy rules, under which there is a unique
local equilibrium. There is a unique local equilibrium, in the neighborhood of a
steady state, when there is also a continuum of divergent solution paths origi-
nating close to that steady state. In the linear approximation of the model, the
divergent solutions are explosive, and are disregarded using arguments such as the
ones in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1983) that are typically outside the model. In the
nonlinear model the alternative equilibria may converge to other steady states, or
exhibit all kinds of cyclical behavior. It is on the basis of these results that the
literature on local determinacy has been criticized by the recent work on global
stability showing that the conditions for local determinacy may in fact be condi-
tions for global indeterminacy (see Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001b),
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) and Christiano and Rostagno (2002)).
1Ricardian policies are policies such that the budget constraint of the government holds also
for prices, that are not necessarily equilibrium prices, while non-Ricardian policies satisfy the
budget constraint only for the equilibrium prices. In Bassetto (2004) while the budget constraint
must hold also out of equilibrium, the zero bound restriction only holds in equilibrium.
3Independent work by Loisel (2006) takes a generic linear model and shows
that with policy rules analogous to the ones we use in this paper it is possible to
exclude explosive paths that originate in the neighborhood of a steady state. He
applies this method to the standard new keynesian linear model as in Woodford
(2003). Because his analysis is local he cannot establish global uniqueness, as
we do. Other related work is by Bloise, Dreze and Polemarchakis (2004) and
Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005). They take a ￿nite horizon monetary model,
or an in￿nite horizon one under particular assumptions, and show that it is not
possible to implement unique equilibria with interest rate targeting.
This paper was motivated by previous work by the authors on optimal mone-
tary policy in an economy under sticky prices. In Adao, Correia and Teles (2003),
it is shown that after choosing the sequence of nominal interest rates there is still a
large set of implementable allocations, each supported by a particular sequence of
money supplies. Implicitly it is assumed that policy can set exogenous sequences
for both interest rates and money supplies, subject to certain restrictions. Al-
ternatively, as we show in this paper, there are single instrument feedback rules
that implement the optimal allocation. Finally, the paper is also related to Adao,
Correia and Teles (2004) where we show that it is possible to implement unique
equilibria in environments with ￿ exible prices and prices set in advance by pegging
state contingent interest rates as well as the initial money supply.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model, a simple
cash-in-advance economy with ￿ exible prices. In Section 3, we show that there are
single instrument feedback rules that implement a unique equilibrium. We also
discuss how a particular equilibrium can be implemented and compare the rules
we propose to alternative rules in the literature, that can only guarantee locally
determinate equilibria. In Section 4, we interpret the results by showing that
the assumption of an in￿nite horizon is a necessary assumption for the results.
In Section 5 we extend the results to the case where prices are set in advance.
Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2. A model with ￿ exible prices
We ￿rst consider a simple cash-in-advance economy with ￿ exible prices. The
economy consists of a representative household, a representative ￿rm behaving
competitively, and a government. The uncertainty in period t ￿ 0 is described
by the random variable st 2 St and the history of its realizations up to period t
(state or node at t), (s0;s1;:::;st), is denoted by st 2 St. The initial realization s0
4is given. We assume that the history of shocks has a discrete distribution.
Production uses labor according to a linear technology. We impose a cash-
in-advance constraint on the households￿transactions with the timing structure
described in Lucas and Stokey (1983). Each period is divided into two subperiods,
with the assets market operational in the ￿rst subperiod and the goods market in
the second.
2.1. Competitive equilibria
Households The households have preferences over consumption Ct, and leisure









where ￿ is a discount factor. The households start period t with nominal wealth
Wt: They decide to hold money, Mt, and to buy Bt nominal bonds that pay RtBt
one period later. Rt is the gross nominal interest rate at date t. They also buy
Bt;t+1 units of state contingent nominal securities. Each security pays one unit of
money at the beginning of period t + 1 in a particular state. Let Qt;t+1 be the
beginning of period t price of these securities normalized by the probability of
the occurrence of the state. Therefore, households spend EtQt;t+1Bt;t+1 in state
contingent nominal securities. Thus, in the assets market at the beginning of
period t they face the constraint
Mt + Bt + EtQt;t+1Bt;t+1 ￿ Wt: (2.2)
Consumption must be purchased with money according to the cash-in-advance
constraint
PtCt ￿ Mt; (2.3)
where Pt is the price of the consumption good in units of money.
At the end of the period, the households receive the labor income WtNt; where
Nt = 1 ￿ Lt is labor and Wt is the nominal wage rate and pay lump sum taxes,
Tt. Thus, the nominal wealth households bring to period t + 1 is
Wt+1 = Mt + RtBt + Bt;t+1 ￿ PtCt + WtNt ￿ Tt (2.4)
5The households￿problem is to maximize expected utility (2.1) subject to the
restrictions (2.2), (2.4), (2.3), together with a no-Ponzi games condition on the
holdings of assets.






















, t ￿ 0 (2.7)
From these conditions we get EtQt;t+1 = 1
Rt. Condition (2.5) sets the in-
tratemporal marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equal
to the real wage adjusted for the cost of using money, Rt. Condition (2.6) is
an intertemporal marginal condition necessary for the optimal choice of risk-free
nominal bonds. Condition (2.7) determines the price of one unit of money at time
t + 1, for each state of nature st+1, normalized by the conditional probability of
occurrence of state st+1, in units of money at time t.
Firms The ￿rms are competitive and prices are ￿ exible. The production func-
tion of the representative ￿rm is
Yt ￿ AtNt:




Government The policy variables are lump sum taxes, Tt, interest rates, Rt,
money supplies, Mt, state noncontingent public debt, Bt. State-contingent debt
is in zero net supply, Bt;t+1 = 0. We can de￿ne a policy as a mapping for the
policy variables fTt;Rt;Mt;Bt, t ￿ 0, all stg, that maps sequences of quantities,
prices and policy variables into sets of sequences of the policy variables.
The period by period government budget constraints are
Mt + Bt = Mt￿1 + Rt￿1Bt￿1 + Pt￿1Gt￿1 ￿ Pt￿1Tt￿1, t ￿ 0
6Let Qt;s ￿ Qt;t+1Qt+1;t+2:::Qs￿1;s, with Qt;t = 1. If limT!1 EtQt;T+1WT+1 = 0,
the sequence of budget constraints are
1 X
s=t
EtQt;s+1Ms (Rs ￿ 1) = Wt +
1 X
s=t
EtQt;s+1Ps [Gs ￿ Ts] (2.9)






















Market clearing Market clearing in the goods and labor market requires
Ct + Gt = AtNt,
and
Nt = 1 ￿ Lt.
We have already imposed market clearing in the money and debt markets.
Equilibrium An equilibrium is a sequence of policy variables, quantities and
prices such that the private agents maximize given the sequences of policy variables
and prices, the budget constraint of the government is satis￿ed and the policy
sequence is in the set de￿ned by the policy.
The equilibrium conditions for the variables fCt;Lt;Rt;Mt;Bt;Tt;Qt;t+1g are
the resources constraints
Ct + Gt = At(1 ￿ Lt), t ￿ 0; (2.11)
the intratemporal condition that is obtained from the households intratemporal






, t ￿ 0; (2.12)
the cash-in-advance constraints (2.3), the intertemporal conditions (2.6) and (2.7),
and the budget constraints (2.9), as well as the government policy rules, to be
speci￿ed below.
73. Single instrument feedback rules.
3.1. Rules that implement unique equilibria.
Here we assume that policy is conducted with either interest rate or money supply
feedback rules. We show the main result of the paper, that there are single
instrument feedback rules that implement a unique equilibrium, globally, for the
allocation and prices. The proposition for an interest rate feedback rule follows:







where ￿t is an exogenous variable, there is a unique global equilibrium.
Proof: When policy is conducted with the rule (3.1), the intertemporal con-
dition (2.6) can be written as
uC(t)
Pt













, t ￿ 0 (3.4)
These conditions together the resource constraints, (2.11), determine uniquely the
variables Ct, Lt, Pt, Rt. The money balances, Mt, is determined uniquely using
the cash-in-advance conditions (2.3), with equality.2
The budget constraints (2.10) are satis￿ed for multiple paths of the taxes and
state noncontingent debt levels.￿
2Notice that when the nominal interest rate is zero the cash-in-advance constraint does not
have to hold with equality. This multiplicity of the money stock has no implications for the
uniqueness of the price level or allocation.
8The forward looking interest rate feedback rules that implement unique global
equilibria resemble to some extent the rules that appear to be followed by cen-
tral banks. The nominal interest rate reacts positively to the forecast of future
consumption. It also reacts positively to the forecast of the future price level.
While the reaction to future economic activity is standard in the policy debate,
the reaction to the price level is not. Central banks appear to respond to forecasts
of future in￿ ation, rather than the price level, when deciding on nominal interest
rates.
Depending on the exogenous process for ￿t, with the feedback rule we consider,
it is possible to decentralize any feasible allocation distorted by the nominal inter-
est rate. The ￿rst best allocation, at the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest
rate, can also be implemented. We discuss this in the next section.
An analogous proposition to the one above is obtained when policy is con-
ducted with a particular money supply feedback rule.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose the cash-in-advance constraint holds exactly.3 When





where ￿t is an exogenous variable, there is a unique global equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose policy is conducted according to (3.5). Then, using the cash-









The two conditions above, (3.6) and (3.7), together with the intratemporal con-
ditions (2.12) and the resource constraints, (2.11) determine uniquely the four
variables, Ct, Lt, Pt, Rt in each period t ￿ 0 and state st.
The taxes and debt levels satisfy the budget constraint (2.10).￿
3This is always the case if the interest rate is strictly positive.
9Also for this money supply rule, for a particular choice of the process of ￿t is
it possible to implement a particular, desirable, equilibrium. The same process
￿t implements the same equilibrium whether the rule is the interest rate rule
(3.1) or the money supply rule (3.5), with one quali￿cation. The implementation
of a unique equilibrium with a money supply rule relies on the cash-in-advance
constraint holding exactly. That is not necessarily the case when the interest rate
is zero. Instead, with an interest rate rule there is always a unique equilibrium
for the allocations and price level. The money stock is not unique when the
cash-in-advance constraint does not hold with equality.
3.2. Implementing equilibria with interest rate feedback rules.
3.2.1. The ￿rst best allocations and equilibria with constant in￿ ation.
Depending on the particular stochastic process for ￿t, it is possible to use the
interest rate feedback rules in Proposition 3.1, (3.1), to select the unique equi-
librium from a large set of possible equilibria, some more desirable than others.
The welfare maximizing equilibrium, which in this simple environment is the ￿rst
best, will have the nominal interest rate equal to zero. Another example of an
equilibrium that can be implemented has zero, or constant, in￿ ation. We will now
describe the processes for ￿t that implement either the ￿rst best or equilibria with
constant in￿ ation.
There is only one ￿rst best allocation but there are many possible equilibrium
processes for the price level associated with that allocation. Varying the process












, t ￿ 0
which, together with the resource constraint (2.11) gives the ￿rst best allocation
described by the functions Ct = C￿(At;Gt), Lt = L￿(At;Gt). The price level






t, t ￿ 0;
10For each k, which is a policy parameter, there is a unique equilibrium process
for the price level. The equilibrium money stock is obtained using the cash-in-
advance constraint, Mt = P(At;Gt;:)C￿(At;Gt), if it holds with equality. If it
did not hold exactly, there would be multiple equilibrium paths for the money
stock that would have no implications for the determination of the prices and
allocations.
Notice that there are still other possible equilibrium processes for the path of
the price level, or realized in￿ ation, that are associated with the Friedman rule.





where ￿t = ￿￿t￿1 +"t, and "t is a white noise, will also imply Rt = 1, and achieve






t, t ￿ 0: (3.8)
The choice of k a⁄ects only the level of the price, while the process of ￿t a⁄ects
realized in￿ ation. The conditional average in￿ ation is the symmetric of the real
interest rate.
Allocations where in￿ ation is always zero,
Pt+1
Pt = 1, can also be implemented,
as long as the real interest rate is non-negative in every state,
uC(t)
Et[￿uC(t+1)] ￿ 1. It is
a feature of these models that there are multiple equilibrium allocations such that
in￿ ation is zero. There are also many price levels consistent with zero in￿ ation.
Again, for a particular ￿t we are able to implement a unique sequence for the
allocations and price level with zero in￿ ation.
Let Ct = C(Rt;:) and Lt = L(Rt;:) be the functions that solve the system
of equations given by the intratemporal condition, (2.12), and the resource con-




, t ￿ 0: (3.9)
Any sequence of nominal interest rates fRtg satisfying this di⁄erence equation,
and corresponding allocations C(Rt;:) and L(Rt;:), is such that in￿ ation is zero.




that solves the di⁄erence









11sequences of numbers so that uC(Ct;Lt) is an exogenous stochastic process. A
particular sequence of interest rates and allocations, and associated price level, P,




, t ￿ 0,























, t ￿ 0 (3.11)
and the resource constraint (2.11) determines a unique equilibrium Ct = Ct,














di⁄erence equation (3.9) would implement an alternative equilibrium with zero
in￿ ation. For each exogenous process, Mt is determined uniquely using the cash-
in-advance conditions (2.3) with equality.
3.2.2. Cashless economies.
In the economies we have analyzed, the nominal interest rate a⁄ects the allocations
because it distorts the decision between consumption and leisure. It is common in
the recent literature with sticky prices (see Woodford, 2003) to consider economies
that in the limit do not have this distortion. In those cashless economies under
￿ exible prices there is a single allocation independent of in￿ ation. All policy does
under ￿ exible prices is to determine the price level. A variation of the feedback
rule we consider is able to determine a unique equilibrium path for the price level.
The way to interpret in our set up a cashless economy is by considering a
cash-in-advance constraint with velocity, and take velocity to the limit where it is




where vt ! 1.






, t ￿ 0; (3.13)











where the nominal interest rate is now Rt+1, rather than Rt, because with in￿nite
velocity the consumption good is a credit good and can be paid at the assets
market in the following period according to the timing of transactions that we
have considered.
Because the interest rate does not a⁄ect the allocations, the allocation is the
￿rst best allocation, described by the functions C￿(At;Gt) and L￿(At;Gt). In
contrast to the economy with a monetary distortion, in these economies there is




, t ￿ 0:
In this case of a cashless economy the policy rule (3.1), in Proposition 3.1,










A particular equilibrium that can be implemented will have zero in￿ ation. As




, t ￿ 0, (3.16)
13it is possible to implement a zero in￿ ation target for the price level, Pt = P.
In this case of a cashless economy, an alternative rule that would determine a




; is the modi￿ed




, t ￿ 0.4 (3.17)
This rule would not work in the more general case where the allocations are
distorted by the nominal interest rate. We show this now.








with Rt rather than Rt+1, was followed for the case analyzed before with unit
velocity, vt = 1. In this case the rule would still be able to pin down uniquely
(and globally) the price level, but the allocation would not be uniquely pinned









This is a ￿rst order di⁄erence equation in Rt with multiple solutions. Each of
those solutions is associated with an equilibrium in the allocations. There are
therefore multiple equilibria. The alternative rule is not able to pin down a single
equilibrium.
3.3. Alternative interest rate rules
The interest rate rules that we consider in this paper are able to implement unique
equilibria globally. This is a contribution to a literature that has concentrated on
conditions for local determinacy or on examples of global indeterminacy. In this
section we relate the interest rate rule we propose to the ones in the literature.
We consider a linear approximation to the model in the neighborhood of a steady
state. We consider alternative rules, where the interest rate reacts to in￿ ation or
to the price level. The latter rules are less standard, but they are still considered
4We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
14in the literature, such as the Wicksellian rules in Woodford (2003), and are closer
to the ones we propose. We show that while all the other rules guarantee a
determinate equilibrium, meaning that there is a unique local equilibrium but
multiple solutions that diverge from the neighborhood of the steady state, and
that suggest the existence of alternative equilibria in the nonlinear model5, the
analog to the rule in Proposition 3.1 eliminates all other solutions other than the
one in the neighborhood of the steady state.
We consider a cashless economy, with in￿nite velocity, where the allocations
are uniquely determined independently of policy. The cash-in-advance constraint
is (3.12), with vt ! 1. The intratemporal conditions of households and ￿rms
imply the marginal conditions (3.13). The allocations are determined uniquely by
these marginal conditions together with the resource constraints, (2.11), and are
not a⁄ected by policy.
We now proceed as is standard in the literature and linearize the model around
a deterministic steady state, with constant consumption and leisure and constant
in￿ ation. For simplicity, let Gt = 0.
The linearized equilibrium conditions (3.13), (3.14) and (2.11), which are the













Pt , cn = uccC
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uL(t)x; x = C;L.
Notice that the equilibrium condition (3.20) has b Rt+1 instead of b Rt. In the
alternative timing used by Woodford (2003) among others the interest rate would
be indexed by t. This has implications for whether rules should be forward, current
or backward in order to guarantee local determinacy. A current rule in Woodford
(2003) with b Rt reacting to b ￿t is equivalent to a backward rule in this environment
with b Rt+1 reacting to b ￿t (see Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) for this discussion).
Suppose now that policy was conducted by setting the nominal interest rate
path, exogenously, equal to a sequence of numbers. This would allow to determine
a unique path for the conditional expectation of in￿ ation Etb ￿t+1, but would not
determine the initial price level, nor the distribution of realized in￿ ation across
5See Benhabib, Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2001b) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001). Those
alternative equilibria cannot be characterized in the linear model that is only a valid approxi-
mation in the neighborhood of the steady state.
15states. The multiplicity of equilibria in this simple model without nominal rigidi-
ties does not a⁄ect allocations. Instead, in the model with nominal rigidities, that
we will consider in Section 5, the multiplicity is extended to the real allocations.
We analyze the simple model to make the points more clearly, but the conclu-
sions go through, more forcefully, in a model with both a monetary distortion and
nominal rigidities.
We consider now alternative interest rate rules that we compare to the ones
in Proposition 3.1. These alternative rules are able to determine locally a unique
equilibrium in the neighborhood of a steady state, but do so at the expense of
multiple other solutions of the linear system that diverge from that neighborhood.
Suppose policy was conducted with an interest rate rule where the nominal
interest rate b Rt+1 reacts to in￿ ation b ￿t,
b Rt+1 = ￿b ￿t ￿ cn
￿





￿b ￿t ￿ Et (b ￿t+1) = 0:
With ￿ > 1, the solution is locally determinate and given by b ￿t = 0. This is the
standard case discussed in the literature where the Taylor principle of an active
rule, with ￿ > 1, is necessary to guarantee a determinate equilibrium.
With an active interest rate rule reacting to in￿ ation, there is indeed, in the
linear model, a single local equilibrium but multiple explosive solutions. If in￿ ation
in period zero was b ￿t = " > 0, the solution would diverge. These divergent
solutions may in the nonlinear model converge to another steady state or cycle
around this steady state, and be equilibrium paths7.
Wicksellian interest rate rules as in Woodford (2003) have the interest rate
respond to the price level rather than in￿ ation. Again here the equivalent rule
to the one in Woodford will have the interest rate in period t + 1 respond to the
price level in t. That rule is
b Rt+1 = ￿b Pt ￿ cn
￿
b At+1 ￿ b At
￿
; 8
where ￿ > 0. Substituting the rule in the equilibrium condition (3.20) with
b ￿t+1 = b Pt+1 ￿ b Pt , we get
(1 + ￿) b Pt ￿ Et b Pt+1 = 0 (3.21)
7See Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001b).
8Again, here, the term ￿cn
￿
b At+1 ￿ b At
￿
is irrelevant for the issue of determinacy.
16With ￿ > 0, there is a determinate equilibrium, locally, in the neighborhood
of the steady state. The price level will be growing at the constant in￿ ation,
possibly zero. There are however, also in this case, other solutions of the linear
model, that diverge from the neighborhood of the steady state. Also with these
rules it is not possible to exclude those other solutions as possible candidates to
equilibria that cannot be analyzed in the linear model. In the linear model they
are explosive and do not satisfy certain bounds that may be imposed arbitrarily.
In the nonlinear model even those bounds may be satis￿ed and there will be in
general alternative equilibria.
An alternative rule with
b Rt+1 = ￿b Pt
and an arbitrarily high ￿ will have the determinate solution be b Pt = 09. Again here
the solution is unique only in a local sense. There are other divergent solutions.
The rule (3.1) in Proposition 3.1. is also a price targeting rule in the sense that
the interest rate reacts to the price level rather than in￿ ation. With our timing it
is a current rule (in Woodford (2003) would be a forward rule) and the coe¢ cient
on the price level is one. In the linear, cashless, model, the rule would be
b Rt+1 = b ￿t + b Pt+1 ￿ cn b At+1: (3.22)
This and (3.20) implies
b Pt = ￿b ￿t ￿ cn b At
which determines a unique equilibrium originating in the neighborhood of the
steady state. All the other solutions of the linear system are excluded. The
equilibrium is unique. If b ￿t = ￿cn b At, then the solution will be
b Pt = 0
as before.
We have shown that the policy rule (3.22) in the linear model is able to generate
a unique equilibrium, eliminating the divergent solutions that are present when
the alternative rules considered above are followed, whether in￿ ation or price level
targeting rules. The result in Proposition 3.1. is stronger because uniqueness is
shown in the actual model of the economy, and not in the linear approximation.
The interest rate rule (3.1) allows to implement a unique equilibrium globally.
With the interest rate feedback rules used above in the nonlinear system, the
9We thank an anonynous referee for this suggestion.
17multiplicity of equilibria originating locally is eliminated and so is the multiplicity
of equilibria originating anywhere else, except for the single equilibrium that the
rule implements.
4. Interpreting the results. The importance of an in￿nite
horizon.
The result that there are single instrument feedback rules that implement unique
equilibria is a surprising one. In fact, it is well known that interest rate rules
may implement a determinate equilibrium, but not a unique global equilibrium.
We have illustrated this in the previous section in a linear approximation to the
model. In that model the interest rate rules considered in the literature generate
multiple solutions one of which possibly in the neighborhood of a steady state.
The analog to the rule we propose eliminates all but one solution.
In this section we show more generally, in the nonlinear model, that the mul-
tiplicity of equilibria with interest rate rules is a general result. On this, whether
the economy has an in￿nite horizon or a ￿nite horizon, possibly arbitrarily large,
is an important assumption. If the economy had a ￿nite horizon, an equilibrium
would be characterized by a ￿nite number of equations and unknowns. In that
case the number of degrees of freedom in conducting policy is a ￿nite number
that does not depend on whether policy is conducted with sequences of numbers
or with feedback rules, functions of future, current or past variables, as long as
these functions are truly exogenous, i.e. independent from the remaining equilib-
rium conditions. Single instrument feedback rules are not su¢ cient restrictions.
They are always unable to pin down unique equilibria. Instead in an in￿nite hori-
zon, as we show in this paper, the way policy is conducted matters, and there are
single instrument feedback rules that guarantee unique global equilibria.
We ￿rst consider the case where monetary policy is conducted with sequences
of numbers for the policy variables. We will show that in that case an interest
rate policy generates multiple equilibria. That result is directly extended to the
case where the interest rate is a function of contemporaneous or past variables.
The equilibrium conditions are the resources constraints, (2.11), the intratem-
poral conditions (2.12), the cash-in-advance constraints (2.3), the intertemporal
conditions (2.6) and the budget constraints (2.10).
These conditions de￿ne a set of equilibrium allocations, prices and policy vari-
ables. There are many equilibria. To see this, notice that, from the resources
constraints, (2.11), the intratemporal conditions (2.12), and the cash-in-advance
18constraints, (2.3), we obtain the functions Ct = C(Rt) and Lt = L(Rt) and
Pt = Mt
C(Rt), t ￿ 0. As long as uC(Ct;Lt)Ct depends on Ct or Lt, excluding there-
fore preferences that are additively separable and logarithmic in consumption, the










, t ￿ 0 (4.1)
together with the budget constraints, (2.10). The budget constraints are satis￿ed
by the choice of lump-sum taxes Ts.
Suppose the path of interest rates is set exogenously in every date and state.
To make the point that an interest rate target is unable to pin down a unique
equilibrium notice that in order for the di⁄erence equation to have a unique solu-
tion we would have to add other restrictions on the other policy variable, money
supply. Suppose the money supply was set exogenously in period zero, M0, and
that it would also be set exogenously for each t ￿ 1, and each state st￿1, in #St￿1
states, where #St is the number of elements of St. In that case there would be
a single solution for the allocations and prices. Similarly, there would also be a
unique equilibrium if the money supply was set exogenously in every date and
state, and so would be the interest rate in period 0, R0, as well as, for each t ￿ 1,
and for state st￿1, the interest rate in #St ￿ 1 states. The budget constraints
restrict, not uniquely, the taxes and debt levels.
If policy was conducted with sequence of numbers for either the interest rate
or the money supply, it would not be possible, in general, to pin down unique
equilibria. The same result holds when policy is conducted with interest rate rules
that depend on current or past variables. Those rules clearly preserve the same
degrees of freedom in the determination of policy. When ￿scal policy is residual,
it would still be necessary to add as additional restrictions the exogenous levels
of the money supply in some but not all states.
The result that either interest rates or money supplies are not su¢ cient in-
struments to pin down unique equilibria, when policy is conducted as a sequence
of numbers, is a general result, with an exception that is useful to understand the
workings of the feedback rules in Proposition 3.1. In the particular case where the









, t ￿ 0: (4.2)
19When the money supply is set exogenously in every state, there is a unique equilib-
rium for the path of the nominal interest rates fRtg. The allocations are therefore
uniquely determined from (2.12) and (2.11). With the allocations uniquely deter-
mined and the money supply set exogenously, the price level is also determined
uniquely from the cash-in-advance constraint (2.3) with equality. In order to have
a unique equilibrium, there is no need of additional restrictions on interest rates.
These particular preferences is another exception to the general principle that
single instrument policy is not able to pin down unique equilibria. The mechanism
is the same as the one that allows the rules in propositions 3.1 and 3.2 to guarantee
unique global equilibria. Notice that the right hand side of the di⁄erence equation
(2.3) is exogenous as in the case of the rules in those propositions.
In the in￿nite horizon the way policy is conducted matters for global multi-
plicity. Characteristics of the environment such as preferences also matter. This
is to some extent an odd result since there are as many money supplies per state
as interest rates, and preferences should not matter when counting equations and
unknowns. The reason why this happens is because the horizon is in￿nite and
counting equations and unknowns when these are in￿nite is not necessarily useful.
In a ￿nite horizon, instead, an equilibrium is described by a ￿nite number of
equations and unknowns. In this case the number of necessary policy restrictions
needed to have a unique equilibrium can be counted exactly. As we will show, in
the analog ￿nite horizon economy, single instrument feedback rules are never able
to pin down unique equilibria.
4.1. Finite horizon economies
In a ￿nite horizon economy10, determining the degrees of freedom in conducting
policy amounts to simply counting the number of equations and unknowns. We
proceed to considering the case where the economy lasts for a ￿nite number of
periods T + 1, from period 0 to period T. After T, there is a subperiod for the
clearing of debts, where money can be used to pay debts, so that
WT+1 = MT + RTBT + PTGT ￿ PTTT = 0
The ￿rst order conditions in the ￿nite horizon economy are the intratemporal
conditions, (2.12) for t = 0;:::;T, the cash-in-advance constraints, (2.3) also for
10See Bloise, Dreze and Polemarchakis (2004) and Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005).














, t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1 (4.3)
and, for any 0 ￿ t ￿ T, and state st, the budget constraints
T￿t X
s=0
EtQt;t+s+1Mt+s (Rt+s ￿ 1) = Wt +
T￿t X
s=0




The budget constraints restrict, not uniquely, the levels of state noncontingent
debts and taxes. Assuming these policy variables are not set exogenously we can










, t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1 (4.4)
Note that the total number of money supplies and interest rates is the same.
Let the number of states in period t, #St, be denoted by ￿t. There are ￿0 +
￿1 + ::: + ￿T of each monetary policy variable. The number of equations is
￿0 +￿1 +:::+￿T￿1. In order for there to be a unique equilibrium need to add to
the system ￿0 + ￿1 + ::: + 2￿T independent restrictions. If the interest rates are
set exogenously in every state, the degrees of freedom are the number of terminal
nodes. Thus, if the money supply could also be determined exogenously it should
be so in every terminal node. Similarly there would be a unique equilibrium if the
money supply was set exogenously in every state and the interest rates were set in
every terminal node. In this sense, the two monetary instruments are equivalent
in this economy.
In the ￿nite horizon economy, the number of degrees of freedom in conducting
policy does not depend on how policy is conducted, whether with sequences of
numbers or with functions of endogenous variables, whether current, backward or
forward.
21When policy is conducted with the forward looking feedback rule in Proposi-
tion 3:1, the policy for the interest rate in the terminal period RT, cannot be a
function of variables in period T +1. It still remains to determine the money sup-
ply in every state at T. While the rule we propose guarantees a unique equilibria
in the in￿nite horizon, it would not do so in a ￿nite horizon economy, even if an
arbitrarily large horizon.
There is an analogous intuition to the one in this model in models with overlap-
ping generations. In those models, while the ￿rst welfare theorem always holds in
a ￿nite horizon, it does not in the in￿nite horizon. In the in￿nite horizon it may be
possible to improve welfare of the initial old generation by transferring resources
from the successive generations. In a ￿nite horizon those transfers would break
down, when the last generation would be unable to obtain its compensation11.
The multiplicity of equilibria in the ￿nite horizon economy also does not de-
pend on price setting restrictions. The price setting restrictions introduce as many
variables as number of restrictions. Instead, in an in￿nite horizon, the irrelevance
of price setting restrictions is not granted. We do this analysis in the following
section.
5. Sticky prices
We have shown the results in the simplest model with ￿ exible prices. Under
￿ exible prices, an interest rate target, in the sense of a policy that sets the path
of nominal interest rates equal to a sequence of numbers, is able to pin down
a unique equilibrium for the real allocations, but not the price level. Instead if
prices are sticky, the same policy will generate multiplicity of real allocations. For
this reason the interest of policy rules that may guarantee uniqueness is higher
when nominal rigidities are considered.
In this section we show that the results derived above extend to an environment
with prices set in advance. We modify the environment to consider price setting
restrictions. There is a continuum of ￿rms, indexed by i 2 [0;1], each producing
a di⁄erentiated good also indexed by i. The ￿rms are monopolistic competitive
and set prices in advance with di⁄erent lags.
The households have preferences described by (2.5) where Ct is now the com-
11Loosely speaking, in our set up, the in￿nite horizon allows to bring in from the future










;￿ > 1; (5.1)
and ct(i) is consumption of good i. Households minimize expenditure
R 1
0 pt(i)ct(i)di,
where pt(i) is the price of good i in units of money, to obtain a given level of the
















The households￿intertemporal and intratemporal conditions are as before, (2.5),
(2.6) and (2.7).












;￿ > 0: (5.4)
Given the prices on each good i, pt(i), the government minimizes expenditure on









Market clearing for each good implies
ct(i) + gt(i) = Atnt(i); (5.6)
while in the labor market it must be that, in equilibrium,
Z 1
0
nt(i)di = Nt. (5.7)








di = AtNt: (5.8)
23We consider now that ￿rms set prices in advance. A fraction ￿j ￿rms set prices
j periods in advance with j = 0;:::J: Firms decide the price for period t with the
information up to period t ￿ j to maximize pro￿ts12:
Et￿j [Qt￿j;t+1 (pt(i)yt(i) ￿ Wtnt(i))];
subject to the production function
yt(i) ￿ Atnt(i)







where yt(i) = ct(i) + gt(i) and Yt = Ct + Gt.
The optimal price for a ￿rm that is setting the price for period t, j periods in
advance, is





























When we compare the two sets of equilibrium conditions, under ￿ exible and
prices set in advance, here we are adding more variables, the prices of the di⁄er-
ently restricted ￿rms, but we also add the same number of equations. To show
that the same arguments in the previous section also work here, it is useful to
rewrite the equilibrium conditions.
Substituting the state contingent prices Qt￿j;t+1 in the price setting conditions
(5.10), and using the intertemporal condition (2.6) as well as the households￿
















= 0, j = 0;:::J:
(5.12)
12Pro￿ts at t are priced by Qt￿j;t+1 because of the timing of transactions where pro￿ts are
received at the end of the period to be use for consumption the period after.









If J = 0, meaning that there are only ￿ exible price ￿rms, pt;0 = Pt and we would







corresponding to (2.12), for the case where ￿ ! 1.











Proposition 5.1. When prices are set in advance, if policy is conducted with the







where ￿t is an exogenous variable, there is a unique equilibrium. Similarly, if




and the cash-in-advance constraints holds exactly, there is also a unique equilib-
rium.





, then the intertemporal condition (2.6) implies
uC(t)
Pt





, t ￿ 0 (5.17)
25These conditions together with the resource constraints (5.15), the intratemporal
conditions (5.12), the conditions on the price level, (5.11), and the cash-in-advance
constraints, (2.3), with equality, determine uniquely all the variables Ct, Lt, Pt,
pt;j, j = 0;:::J, and Mt. p0;j, j = 1;:::J are exogenous.
The budget constraints (2.10) are satis￿ed for multiple paths of the taxes and
state noncontingent debt levels.
Clearly the same arguments in the proof of Proposition 3.2, for the money
supply rule under ￿ exible prices, apply here.￿
We have shown that the results extend to environments with sticky prices, in
particular when prices are set in advance in a staggered fashion. In the following
section we illustrate the results by describing how the interest rate rule works in
a simpler economy where all ￿rms set prices one period in advance.
5.1. An example: All ￿rms set prices one period in advance.
We now consider an economy where all ￿rms set prices one period in advance. This
is a simple example that illustrates how the interest rate rule is able to determine
unique equilibria also when prices are sticky.
In a model where there is only one type of ￿rms that set prices one period
in advance, the equilibrium conditions can be summarized by the conditions that





, then, as before we have
uC(t)
Pt





, t ￿ 0 (5.19)










= 0, t ￿ 1
Ct + Gt = At (1 ￿ Lt): (5.20)
which determine the variables Ct, Lt and the predetermined prices Pt, with P0
exogenous. Money supply is determined from the cash-in-advance constraint
PtCt = Mt: (5.21)
266. Concluding Remarks
The problem of multiplicity of equilibria under an interest rate policy has been ad-
dressed, after Sargent and Wallace (1975) and McCallum (1981), by an extensive
literature on determinacy under interest rate rules. Interest rate feedback rules
on endogenous variables such as the in￿ ation rate, or the price level, can, with
appropriately chosen coe¢ cients, deliver determinate equilibria, i.e. unique local
equilibria in the neighborhood of a steady state. There are still multiple solutions
to the system of di⁄erence equations that approximates linearly the model. Those
additional solutions suggest other equilibria that can be analyzed in the nonlinear
model. Indeed, it is a consensual result that there are multiple equilibria when
policy is conducted with single instrument rules.
In this paper we show that there are interest rate feedback rules, and also
money supply feedback rules, that implement unique global equilibria. This re-
sult does not depend on preferences or other similar characteristics of the envi-
ronment. It is also robust to the consideration of nominal rigidities such as prices
set in advance. The way this rule works in pinning down unique equilibria in our
simple set up is by eliminating expectations of future variables from the dynamic
equations. In alternative more complex environments, the policy rule may need
to be modi￿ed so that the same result may be achieved.
The feedback rules that we propose can be used to pin down the welfare
maximizing equilibria, but the policy maker can also implement uniquely other,
less desirable, equilibria.
An important assumption for our results, which is the standard assumption
in the literature, is that the time horizon is in￿nite. Otherwise, single instrument
feedback rules would never be able to pin down unique equilibria.
Anther important assumption is that ￿scal policy is Ricardian, in the sense
that taxes can be used as a residual variable to satisfy the budget constraint
of the government. Likewise, it is important that the zero bound condition be
imposed in equilibrium and not as a restriction to the out of equilibrium actions
of the government. In this we follow most of the literature, in particular Bassetto
(2004).
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